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Embodied cognitive theories predict that linguistic conceptual representations are
grounded and continually represented in real world, sensorimotor experiences.
However, there is an on-going debate on whether this also holds for abstract concepts.
Grammar is the archetype of abstract knowledge, and therefore constitutes a test
case against embodied theories of language representation. Former studies have
largely focussed on lexical-level embodied representations. In the present study we
take the grounding-by-modality idea a step further by using reaction time (RT) data
from the linguistic processing of nominal classifiers in Chinese. We take advantage
of an independent body of research, which shows that attention in hand space is
biased. Specifically, objects near the hand consistently yield shorter RTs as a function
of readiness for action on graspable objects within reaching space, and the same
biased attention inhibits attentional disengagement. We predicted that this attention
bias would equally apply to the graspable object classifier but not to the big object
classifier. Chinese speakers (N = 22) judged grammatical congruency of classifier-noun
combinations in two conditions: graspable object classifier and big object classifier.
We found that RTs for the graspable object classifier were significantly faster in
congruent combinations, and significantly slower in incongruent combinations, than the
big object classifier. There was no main effect on grammatical violations, but rather an
interaction effect of classifier type. Thus, we demonstrate here grammatical category-
specific effects pertaining to the semantic content and by extension the visual and
tactile modality of acquisition underlying the acquisition of these categories. We
conclude that abstract grammatical categories are subjected to the same mechanisms
as general cognitive and neurophysiological processes and may therefore be
grounded.
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Introduction
A crucial question in the study of linguistic meaning is
whether semantics can be defined in terms of word–word and
morpheme–morpheme contextual relations only, or if some
additional grounding also play a role that links the linguistic
representation to the objects and events of reference (i.e., word-
world relations) when humans use and understand language.
Although children evidently learn language in a context of
direct reference to objects, events and situations, it is less
clear how the acquisition process later affects how linguistic
representations are stored and retrieved in adulthood. A priori it
is entirely possible that linguistic knowledge, whose grammatical
systems pass on at a relatively slow changing pace through
generations, in the individual the result of implicit learning
(cf. Escandell-Vidal et al., 2011, implicit learning of artificial
grammars in Reber, 1967; Daltrozzo and Conway, 2014; Folia and
Petersson, 2014; Schuchard and Thompson, 2014, for grammar
in procedural memory see Ullman et al., 1997; Ullman, 2001a,b;
Tomblin et al., 2007), fully automatized and non-conscious,
attains an autonomous status in self-contained systems once
learned; previously it was generally held that language is
represented in a separate module in the brain isolate from
general cognition and that the human language faculty basically
consists of amodal symbol manipulation and grammatical rules
(Chomsky, 1957; Fodor, 1980, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1984; Anderson,
1990; Hauser et al., 2002; Jackendoff, 2002). In contrast, later
proposals imply that language is a special case of general
cognition. Embodiment views of language and cognition respond
to the grounding problem (Searle, 1980; Harnad, 1990), and
are based on the idea that cognitive representations derive
from and are shaped by the type of experiences humans
have with their bodies. We do not have a direct mind-
free access to the external world, but rather conceptualize
it through how we experience it in bodily interaction. If
language, then, is a special case of general cognition (Langacker,
1987), and not amodal and encapsulated, we can expect that
linguistic concepts and categories be grounded in the same
way.
If the body constrains how concepts are constructed,
the consecutive use of these concepts depends on how
these experiences can be successfully retrieved from memory.
The crucial question is whether understanding also implies
recollecting the manner in which a concept was acquired. A basic
assumption in grounded theories of cognition is the fact that
concepts are fundamentally perceptual in nature. This belief has
developed in parallel with the emerging neuroimaging studies
and behavioral data (for a review, see Barsalou, 2008) showing
that modality-specific perceptual (Kan et al., 2003; Gonzales
et al., 2006; Trumpp et al., 2013; Amsel et al., 2014) and
motor (Jeannerod, 2001) areas of the brain are recruited when
the meaning of concepts and sentences are understood. When
conceptual stimuli are processed, perceptual, and motor areas
are activated that correspond to the meanings of these words;
supporting the idea that conceptual processing is built upon
sensorimotor processes (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Goldberg et al.,
2006). The retrieval of conceptual meaning thus involves a
partial re-enactment (simulation) of experiences during concept
acquisition (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Barsalou et al., 2003).
The particular grounding features relevant to nominal
classifier categories can often be associated with one or more
sensory and motor modalities, typically visual, or tactile (Lee,
1987). All types of nominal classifiers, such as the numeral
classifiers in Chinese, are examples of grammatical units that
generalize over a large set of nouns, taking but a few of the
common semantic features of these nouns as its sole semantic
content. Diachronically, such morphemes generally derive from
a lexical item, and extract a property seen as relevant to other
referents that possess the same feature.
Cross-linguistically, as in Chinese, so-called sortal classifiers
describe the semantic essence of an ontologically, functionally
or culturally determined category, typically HUMAN, ANIMAL,
FOOD, TOOL, or in relation to cognitively salient features
like SIZE, SHAPE, or MATERIAL classes (Aikhenvald, 2000;
Grinevald, 2000; Senft, 2000). Hence, semantic or other cognitive
aspects of the noun determine the choice of a particular classifier.
Chinese has several dozens of classifiers, some more and others
less frequently used (for a full list, see, e.g., Chao, 1968, section
7.9). A typical linguistic function of classifiers is reference
tracking in communicative situations, narrowing down the scope
of potential referents. These deictic elements therefore behave
as typical grounding devices, supported by the fact that through
time, classifiers commonly develop into pronouns, the ultimate
grounding device in language. Chinese, as well as several other
Asian languages (e.g., Japanese, Vietnamese), classify nouns
inter alia according to the graspability affordances (Gibson,
1966, 1977) of the noun referents when these nouns occur
with numerals or demonstrative pronouns (i.e., in referencing
expressions). This type of classifier semantics provides a yet
unexplored link to an independent field of research within
cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
Cognitive and neurophysiological processing in peripersonal
hand space is a well-researched area that lends itself to testing
whether a cognitive bias influences linguistic processing. In this
field, investigations have shown that while attention to graspable
objects in near space engages human attention in preparation for
action (Reed et al., 2006), attention is also harder to disengage
from objects within hand space (Abrams et al., 2008; Tseng et al.,
2012) due to the constant alertness for action toward graspable
objects in our immediate vicinity. Since graspable objects in
near space enjoy this special status of mental and physical
immediacy as well as a type of inertia that causes the mind
to linger, grammatical categories referring to graspable objects
are apt to investigate if there is a difference in how abstract
grammatical categories are mentally integrated and grounded.
We therefore wanted to explore the possibility that such effects
apply not only to attention, perception and memory of real-
world, concrete objects, but also to the semantic processing of
non-conscious, implicitly acquired linguistic concepts related to
hand and action space. These grammatical elements are also part
of the speakers’ established knowledge systems, in other words,
top–down knowledge. Crucially, if grammatical categories are
indeed grounded by sensorimotor modality, it follows that any
idiosyncrasy of these modalities will affect storage and retrieval
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of the grammatical categories in the exact same manner as
in perception and cognition. Could top–down, non-conscious
processing of grammatical affixes related to the hand be linked
to attention processing? In the following, we demonstrate that
nominal classifiers are indeed grounded, and likely derived from
and continually represented in humans’ sensory and motor
experiences in the world.
How does the hand affect cognition? The position of the
hand influences our perception of the environment, attentional
control, as well as memory and higher-order cognition
(Brockmole et al., 2013). Moreover, sensory and attentional
networks appear to be interlinked. In patients with visual neglect
(heminanopsia), the ability to detect objects in the impaired
hemifield can be nearly doubled if the patient’s hand is placed
in the blind field (Schendel and Robertson, 2004). Placing the
hand near an object can also affect early preattentive processes in
healthy subjects, e.g., the segregation of objects from backgrounds
(Cosman and Vecera, 2010). Brockmole et al. (2013) explain
these perceptual enhancements as a potential ‘shift from the
perception-oriented parvocellular pathway toward the action-
oriented magnocellular pathway’ when objects appear near the
hands, an assumption that is consistent with recent works (Gozli
et al., 2012; Goodhew et al., 2013; Weidler and Abrams, 2014).
Two types of attention bias have been demonstrated in
hand space: faster engagement and slower disengagement. For
what concerns faster engagement, Reed et al. (2006, 2007, 2010)
developed an embodied model of spatial cognition through several
studies (Garza et al., 2013), which investigated the effect of hand,
trunk, head direction and body posture on attention, arguing
that early, sensory-related processing in the body has an effect
on visual processing. This fostered a surge of studies on biased
attention in tool and hand space (e.g., Tipper et al., 1998; Handy
et al., 2005; Meinert, 2011; Gozli et al., 2012; Tseng et al., 2012;
Goodhew et al., 2013; Langerak et al., 2013; Thomas, 2013). Reed
et al. (2010) found that targets appearing in the hand’s grasping
space – near the palm – produced faster responses than when the
targets were presented to the back of the hand or the forearm. The
same effect was observed using a rake (i.e., a tool). They point
out that bottom–up modulation of attention can be modulated
on the basis of inputs from the body as well as from visual cues,
and that changing the body position can change the salience of
space. Hence, a likely effect of peripersonal space is a readiness to
act within that space, and that this readiness, in addition to being
supported by special visuotactile cells, is aided by endogenous,
or top–down attention to objects in an individual’s immediate
vicinity.
Contrary to this, with respect to slower disengagement, it
has been shown that items near the hand demand longer
processing times than comparable situations away from the
hand. For instance, Abrams et al. (2008) reported a difficulty
of disengagement effect for objects in hand space. The authors
demonstrated that people were slower to disengage their
attention from the visual stimuli in both space (inhibition of
return and visual search experiments) and time (attentional blink
task) when these were presented near the hand. In addition, a
difficulty-of-disengagement effect was also observed in a top–
down conscious processing study by Davoli and Abrams (2009),
who found in a visual search task that participants searched
through the display at a slower rate when they held their hands
behind their backs and imagined their hands to be near the
display.
Thus, attention bias in hand space has been demonstrated for
perception and cognition, but does it also parallel grammatical
processing of abstract semantic categories? In the grounding
debate, there exists some confusion on what makes a concept
abstract. A clarification with respect to the nature of the
stimuli used in this experiment is therefore in place. A primary
characteristic of grammatical categories is their general
applicability, responding to the diverse situations in our everyday
lives: a minimum of semantic features makes the category
maximally versatile. An effect of this flexibility is that it distances
itself from the individual concrete objects and situations.
Therefore, the degree to which a morpheme is grammaticalized
reflects its abstraction level. Grammaticalization is the diachronic
process in which a lexical item changes to a grammatical item
while its meaning also changes from more concrete/specific
to more abstract/general (Zhiqun Xing, 2012). Highly
grammaticalized morphemes are more abstract in the sense
that they are semantically more general, more text-frequent
and syntactically defined, as well as phonologically simpler
than its historical source than comparable morphemes in less
grammaticalized languages (Bybee, 2003; Narrog and Heine,
2011). Nominal classifiers in Chinese have in general been
subject to grammaticalization processes during the last two
1000 plus years (Erbaugh, 1986), turning once lexical items into
abstract grammatical morphemes. For example, the original
meaning of the default classifier gè , which today is devoid of
meaning and serves only to fulfill a grammatical requirement,
was ‘bamboo’. To what extent are classifiers used in this
experiment grammaticalized? Although traditionally classified
as an isolating language, Chinese demonstrates a consistently
deeper level of grammaticalization than for example Thai,
a language with parallel constructions (Post, 2007). In these
parallel constructions, the Chinese forms exhibit greater degrees
of semantic bleaching, syntactic behavioral restrictions, and
phonological erosion. With respect to the classifiers used as
stimuli in the present investigation, several conditions confirm
their grammaticalized status. First, these nominal classifiers can
be syntactically defined since they are linguistic morphemes
mandatorily occurring when a number or a deictic element or
measure term is part of the noun phrase, e.g., with yí ‘one’, san
‘three’, shí ‘ten’, with the quantifying expression bàn ‘half ’ and
with demonstrative pronouns, e.g., zhèi ‘this’, nèi ‘that’, or nìi
‘which’. The structural status of classifiers is also evident by the
fact that Chinese uses a default classifier gè ( ) whenever a
special classifier is not appropriate, because the slot in the noun
phrase has to be filled for the phrase to be grammatical. The use of
the bǎ ( ) classifier is evidently highly productive, demonstrating
its involvement in a grammatical rule1. A canonical trait of
1In an Internet search we found more than 18, 2 million occurrences of bǎ
combined with the number one ( ). In comparison, the non-general, highly
specialized pǐ ( ) classifier used only of horses produced only 1,25 million
instances. The big object zuò ( ) classifier gave 46,5 million, and the most
productive default gè ( ) classifier yielded 614 million instances.
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grammaticalization is that the process unfolds across several
generations of language learners, and therefore evolves at the
level of implicit learning and non-conscious processing. Once
a source lexeme has given rise to one or several novel usages, it
may eventually get lost or replaced by near equivalents, leaving
speakers no option to backtrack semantics. The established
grammatical morphemes will then be stored as abstract concepts
with relevance to grammar only. The classifier for graspable
objects displays such traits of grammaticalization. Its original
function was lexical: in Middle Chinese, it functioned as a verb
meaning ‘to grasp, to take hold of ’ (Peyraube, 1996). In modern
Mandarin Chinese, however, ba (unmarked for tone in this
paragraph on its historical origin) is no longer used as a main
verb or noun, since these have now been replaced by compounds
(Post, 2007). Ba has grammaticalized into three synchronically
unrelated usages. From the verbal function three grammatical
functions emerged: (1) an accusative marker in transitive
sentences (Chao, 1968; Thompson, 1973; Li and Thompson,
1974; Liu, 2013; in Post, 2007 referred to as the ‘manipulated
object construction’), (2) a purposive marker, and (3) a nominal
classifier used to classify nouns with numerals or demonstrative
pronouns. The original ‘grasp’ meaning of the lexical verb has
been lost and replaced another verb ná ‘to take’. Hence, the usage
of ba as a lexical verb no longer is considered grammatical, cf. tâ
zhi xi tâ ng ná (∗bâ) yî-ge lí [3p only reckon take (∗take) one-CL
pear] ‘He only planned to take a single pear.’ By comparison,
the equivalent ’awManipulated.Obj.Marker in Thai has retained its
status as a full verb (Post, 2007). In addition, tonal loss of ba in
discourse is observed with some speakers of Chinese, possibly
pointing to a first stage of phonological erosion (Post, 2007).
The above serves to illustrate that these present-day usages of ba
clearly fulfill highly specialized grammatical functions. Post
(2007) concludes that ‘[b]oth the increasingly abstract semantics
and the high degree of event-integration in ba-marked clauses,
support a view of relatively advanced grammaticalization.’
With respect to the other classifier used in this experiment,
zuò , for big, stationary objects, its semantics is related to the
word for ‘to sit’ . Part of its semantics is that these referents,
in addition to being non-movable objects, would be too large to
physically hold in hand, and this classifier is therefore a useful
contrast and control to the special semantics associated with the
graspable noun classifier.
In the current study we aimed at investigating the abstract
grammatical representation of haptic affordances contrasted with
a comparable grammatical category that did not imply such
affordances inMandarin Chinese, to look for potential grounding
effects in the former. Specifically, we tested whether the nominal
classifier bǎ, which is used in conjunction with nouns denoting
graspable objects, is processed differently from the classifier
zuò, which is used with nouns that refer to big and stationary
items that cannot be handheld. We only included senses of the
graspable-object classifier in which it directly signifies object
affordances, and not in its less common usage as ‘a handful’,
in which case it rather functions as a container classifier.
This separate type of quantifier construction is semantically
distinguishable since it occurs only with mass nouns. This usage
aligns with many other body part containers, e.g., yi liǎn huî
[one face dust] ‘a faceful of dust,’ yi dùzi qì [one stomach anger]
‘a stomachful of grievance,’ and yi tóu bái fâ [one head white
hair] ‘a headful of white hair’ (Li and Thompson, 1981). No such
instances of bǎ were included in the stimuli. Since the RTs were
measured at the appearance of the noun, the two semantic types
cannot be confused.
We predicted that the classifier categorizing graspable object
nouns would prime toward engaging Chinese speakers’ attention
based on experiences of preparation for action; likewise that this
classifier would prime toward a more arduous disengagement of
attention than the big object nominal classifier when the classifier-
noun pair was incongruent (ungrammatical). Consequently, a
readiness for action-effect should not only predict faster RTs
in the graspable classifier condition when the classifier-noun
pairs are congruent (grammatical), but also show a concomitant
slower disengagement-effect when the classifier-noun pairs are
incongruent.
We also predicted an interaction effect for classifiers,
specifically that the congruent classifier-noun pairs in the
graspable classifier condition would be associated with faster
grammaticality judgments compared to congruent classifier-
noun pairs in the big classifier condition. Likewise, we predicted
that incongruent classifier-noun pairs in the graspable classifier
condition would be associated with longer RTs compared to
incongruent classifier-noun pairs in the big classifier condition.
Here, we expected that the recognition of a non-graspable noun
that violate grammar to be significantly delayed, in which case the
priming of the graspable classifier should result in a difficulty of
disengagement effect. The participants’ recognition of congruent
graspable nouns, by contrast, would be facilitated by the already
alerted attention, due to the classifier’s priming effect. That is, RTs
will be significantly longer than in the control condition when the
classifier-noun pair is incongruent than when it is congruent.
If this pattern is confirmed, there will be reason to think that
the graspable object classifier is grounded. Conversely, if there
is no significant difference in reaction times (RTs) between the
congruent big and grasp classifier conditions, this will suggest
that the two classifiers are stored and processed in the same
manner, in other words, an argument in favor of amodal theories.
In that case, there is no reason to think that what is known
about attention in peripersonal space in the neurophysiological
or behavioral paradigms has any consequences for how language
is stored and processed. Another possible outcome is that
there will be a difference between congruent and incongruent
trials such that incongruent trials will be processed slower
than both congruent conditions. In that case, the main effect
is on congruency and attributable to a general grammatical
violation effect. This RT pattern will also corroborate amodal




Twenty-five native Chinese speakers (Mean age= 28.5; SD= 4.4;
13 females) took part in the experiment. They were recruited
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from an internet-based forum for Chinese students residing
in Norway. All participants reported being right-handed. All
had normal, or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and normal
hearing. All procedures conformed to national and institutional
guidelines and the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants gave their
written informed consent before taking part in the study, and
were compensated NOK 500 at the end of the session.
Design and Materials
Participants performed a grammaticality judgment test that
involved correct and incorrect combinations of two SIZE
DOMAIN classifiers (CL): bǎ, used for small, graspable objects
(typically kitchen and agricultural tools and other objects with
a handle such as umbrellas, teapots, abaci; musical instruments
with a neck: cello, violin, and other hand-size objects), and
the classifier zuò, which is used for large, stationary
objects (typically large constructions like bridges, mansions
and skyscrapers, public parks, icebergs and mountains). The
task was to decide whether Chinese classifier-noun pairs are
grammatical (congruent) or ungrammatical (incongruent). The
stimuli was in part drawn from the MDBG online Chinese
dictionary, and in part from the Chinese equivalent of Google,
baidu.com, by searching for combinations of the Chinese number
‘one’ in conjunction with each classifier. Five native Chinese
speakers subsequently controlled that congruent classifier-noun
pairs were indeed grammatical, and that incongruent pairs were
ungrammatical. In the first condition, a typical congruent trial is
the numeral noun phrase [Yî bǎ . . . shǒuqiāng] ‘one-
CL:GRASPABLE.OBJECT...pistol’, and in the incongruent trial
[Yî bǎ . . . shān mài] ‘one- CL:GRASPABLE.OBJECT
. . . mountain range.’ In the second condition for the big object
classifier, a typical congruent noun phrase is [Yî zuò...
qiáo] ‘one-CL:BIG.OBJECT bridge’ and incongruent
[Yî zuò... pútao] ‘one-CL:BIG.OBJECT grape’. A full list of the
stimuli is provided in the supplemental material.
Procedure
The participants performed a practice session prior to the
experiment to prevent effects related to inter-individual
differences in task learning. The experiment was divided into
two sessions, each session lasting for ∼15 min. During the short
break between the first and second session, participants were
instructed to rest.
The design was an orthogonal combination of two experimen-
tal within factors: 2 Congruency (congruent, incongruent) × 2
Classifiers (graspable, big). Thus, there were four conditions
of trials, (1) graspable-congruent, (2) graspable-incongruent,
(3) big-congruent, and (4) big-incongruent. 40 grammatically
correct pairs were used in each congruent condition, and 20
grammatically incorrect pairs were used in each incongruent
condition. The classifier-noun combinations were compound
trials, i.e., trials consisting of two separate stimuli. Compound
trials required a yes-no response. In addition, participants were
presented with 20 partial trials (Ollinger et al., 2001a,b) and
44 randomized short periods of rest, each equal in length to
one trial. Partial trials presented only the classifier followed by
a blank screen in the noun time window, and did not require
a grammaticality judgment on part of the participants. These
were therefore not included in the RT calculations. Altogether,
each participant received all the 120 pairs of congruent
and incongruent combinations, following proper across trial
counterbalancing.
The RT data was collected in an fMRI experiment while
participants were also scanned (Philips Achieva 3 Tesla MR
scanner, Philips Medial Systems, Netherlands). The image data
are not reported in this article. The experiment was implemented
in E-Prime 2.0 (Psychological Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh,
PA, USA), and presented on an MR-compatible LCD-screen
(NNL LCD Monitor R© , NordicNeuroLab, Bergen, Norway),
placed at the head of the scanner bore, and projected to the
supine participants via a mirror mounted on the coil that was
positioned over the participants’ heads. Screen resolution was
set to 1920 × 1080 at 60 Hz, and field of view measured 32◦
visual angle, effective viewing distance 1.2 m. All characters were
presented in the font “SimSun”, font size 58. All stimulus displays
were made equal in terms of luminance and visual complexity.
In each trial, participants were first presented a fixation display
consisting of a black (RGB: 0, 0, 0) centered crosshair on a gray
(RGB: 128, 128, 128) background. Participants were instructed to
fixate the crosshair from fixation display onset and until display
offset. After 1000 ms the fixation display was replaced by a
classifier display consisting of a Chinese numeral-classifier (color
black) on a gray background for 2000 ms, followed by a short
inter-stimulus interval (ISI) displaying an empty gray display
for either 400, or 600 ms. ISI duration was fully randomized
and could thus not be predicted in advance. The noun display
followed immediately after ISI display offset. In this display,
the participants were presented a Chinese noun (color black)
on a gray background for 2000 ms. Both classifiers and nouns
were fully randomized in order to prevent the participant from
adapting to a response pattern due to regularities in the program.
Participants were instructed to give their responses by pressing
the right index finger-button for correct pairs, and the right
middle finger-button for incorrect pairs on the response pad.
The response had to be given before noun display offset. Any
responses occurring outside this time frame were not logged,
and these trials were excluded from data analysis. In addition,
incorrect responses, rest trials and partial trials were excluded
from the analysis (44% of total trials) leaving 2095 trials to
analyse. A gray inter-trial interval (ITI) display lasting 1000, 5000,
or 9000 ms was presented between each experiment trial, and the
duration of the ITI displays were fully randomized (see Figure 1
for the sequence of events over a trial).
Data Analysis
Both accuracy and RTs were recorded for each of the four
trial types. The percentage of correct responses was calculated
to measure each participant’s performance accuracy. Two
participants out of 24 were excluded from the analyses because
overall accuracy failed to reach 90%. Finally, 22 participants were
included in the behavioral analyses. Incorrect responses (4.13% of
trials) or latencies that were 2 standard deviation above or below
each participant’s mean (5.15% of trials) were excluded from the
analyses.
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of events in a representative trial of the
congruent graspable objects classifier condition.
Within-subject analyses were performed on RTs (ms)
by means of repeated-measures ANOVA using Congruency
(congruent, incongruent) and Classifier (graspable, big) as
within-subjects factors. A post-hoc analysis using the Duncan
test was used for multiple comparisons. The level of statistical
significance was set at 5% (p < 0.05).
Results
The ANOVA showed significant main effect of Congruency,
F(1,21) = 12.67, p < 0.005, η2 = 0.924. Participants were
faster in the congruent condition (M = 831.8) than in
the incongruent condition (M = 884.82). Furthermore,
results demonstrated a significant interaction between
Classifier × Congruency, F(1,21) = 8.72, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.804.
In the graspable congruent (M = 816.14) participants were
faster than graspable incongruent (M = 900.62; p < 0.001),
big congruent (M = 847.48; p < 0.05) and big incongruent
(M = 869.03; p < 0.005) confirming the greater facility to
elaborate graspable congruent compared to all the other
conditions; in addition, they were faster with big incongruent
trials than graspable incongruent (p < 0.05). Figure 2 shows all
significant results.
Discussion
In the present experiment we have shown that in a grammatical
procedure, the semantic content of grammatical markers
affects the speakers’ RTs. In accordance with our hypothesis,
our results showed that grammatical violations of classifier-
noun combinations produce significantly faster RTs on a
grammaticality judgment task when the initial classifier implicitly
refers to graspable objects customarily used in hand space,
than when the classifier refers to non-graspable objects typically
FIGURE 2 | Mean reaction times (RTs) as a function of Classifiers and
Congruency. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals computed with
the formula of Loftus and Masson (1994) for within-subject designs. Asterisks
denote significant post hoc comparisons: ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.005. C,
congruent; I, incongruent.
viewed in extrapersonal space. In both conditions, RTs are
longer when the classifier-noun pair is incongruent than when
they are congruent. However, it was shown that RTs in
the graspable classifier incongruent condition are significantly
longer compared to the big classifier incongruent condition.
Because there is an interaction effect between classifier and
grammaticality judgment, it is the classifier rather than the
grammaticality judgment that drives the differences in RTs. We
have assumed on linguistic grounds, i.e., on the basis of what is
known about grammaticalization processes in general and with
respect to how these processes have affected nominal classifier
stimuli in Chinese in particular, that the content of the stimuli
are not only highly abstract mental representations, but also
implicitly learned and non-consciously processed. While not
being readily accessible to the speakers’ conscious minds, the
semantic content of the grammatical units may still be processed
in the brain according to embodiment principles. Given the
pre-existing research on profound effects on hands’ presence
on attention, perception, learning and memory, we argue that
these effects for the graspable classifier condition is a result of
the special semantics of this grammatical marker, reflecting a
readiness for action as well as a difficulty of disengagement effect
within the peripersonal space. This demonstrates, in our view,
that grammatical categories like the ones under discussion here
are grounded.
This is not unlikely because Chinese classifier-noun processing
has been shown to trigger ERP effects compatible with semantic
as well as syntactic representation. Neuropsychological studies
have shown that Chinese numeral classifiers in combination with
incongruent nouns evoke an N400 effect, an index of semantic
processing or semantic integration, as well as a P600 effect,
which is rather associated with syntactic integration (Jiang and
Zhou, 2012; Chou et al., 2014). However, which one is primary
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is still under debate. For example, it appears that while some
semantic information is reflected in such studies, not all semantic
values trigger the N400 effect; Zhang et al. (2012) report that
although congruency mismatch evoke an N400 effect, semantic
violations relating to animacy in classifier-noun pairs in Chinese
does not increase the N400 amplitude. This suggests that at
least some conceptual aspects of classifier-noun pairs are not
directly involved in conscious semantic integration of classifier
and noun. Further evidence indicate that classifier-noun pairs
are handled by the brain as a syntactic component; in the
same study, the N400 effect was followed by a P600 effect for
incongruent animacy-mismatch pairs, but not for incongruent
animacy-match classifier-noun pairs. By contrast, Hsu et al.
(2014) identifies classifier-noun mismatches as a semantic but
not a syntactic violation, since no P600 effect was observed in
their results. They used stimuli where the classifier and noun
was intercepted by a relative clause, and observed an N400
effect at the appearance of the head noun, suggesting that
classifier-noun semantic agreement is retained in memory even
at a distance. This duality of semantic-syntactic representation
underpins our interpretation of the RT results that the classifiers
are grammaticalized in a syntactic automatized procedure, but
their processing still depends on semantic representation in the
Chinese speakers’ brains.
Alternative Interpretations: Usage Frequency
Effects
Our main claim is that it is the semantic content of the classifier
categories that drives the RT effects. However, before reaching
a final conclusion, other possible explanations must be ruled
out. A well-known contributor to RT effects in language studies
is usage frequency. If, say, the graspable object classifier with
accompanying nouns is far more frequently used than the big
object classifier, this could potentially trigger faster RTs in this
classifier’s congruent condition, not as a ‘readiness to act,’ but
because CL:GRASPABLE.OBJECT-noun combination would be
more common and hence easier to retrieve and recognize than
CL:BIG.OBJECT-noun combinations.
Two studies consider usage frequencies of the
CL:GRASPABLE.OBJECT bǎ and CL:BIG.OBJECT zuò in
various corpora; Zhiqun Xing (2012) gives frequency counts
of the 16 most commonly used classifiers in Modern Chinese,
selecting out of 178 instances from A Chinese-English Dictionary
of Measure Words [Classifiers] (Jiao, 2001) classifiers with
more than 10,000 occurrences. The frequency counts are based
on three grammatical environments where Modern Chinese
nominal classifiers are used in the online corpus compiled by
the Center of Chinese linguistics, Peking University (2005): on
CL occurrences with the numeral yî ‘one’, demonstratives zhé/nà
‘this/that’, as well as the interrogative words jǐ ‘how many’ and nǎ
‘which’. The count shows that on the whole, the CL:BIG.OBJECT
is in fact used nearly twice as often (24,507 times) as the
CL:GRASPABLE.OBJECT (13,531 times). In comparison, the
total number of instances of the overall most productive default
gè classifier stands out by 822, 988 times. See Table 1.
In another study, Gao and Malt (2009) include the
GRASPABLE.OBJECT classifier bǎ and BIG.OBJECT classifier
TABLE 1 | Frequencies of ‘Big’, ‘Grasp’, and default classifiers, taken from
a count of the 16 most commonly used (>10,000 occurrences) classifiers










zuò big ‘Object with
a base’
15,974 8,003 530 24,507
bǎ grasp ‘Hands-on
object’
11,440 1,763 328 13,531
gè default Generic 502,039 268,650 52,299 822,988
zuò in a larger group of 126 specific (‘individual’, in their
terminology) classifiers, deemed to be ‘a list of the more
commonly recognized classifiers.’ Occurrences and frequency
rates were based on language material from both literary and
spoken sources: Chinese books, newspapers (People’s Daily,
Overseas Edition), dictionaries (Chen et al., 1988), as well
as casual conversations between native Chinese speakers in
an American university. The selection of classifiers was then
subjected to familiarity judgments by six Chinese graduate
students (three of them in Beijing). Numbers represent
frequencies for the classifier when used in a text corpus of 10
million words. The frequency rates shown here are number of
occurrences divided by 1,000. In this material (Gao and Malt,
2009, Appendix A), the grasp classifier bǎ received a frequency
score of 0.1516 and the big classifier zuò a score of 0.2135,
indicating again that zuò is actually used more frequently than bǎ
(by comparison, in this material, the highly productive, general
classifier gè is given a frequency rate of 8.5547). The fact that the
general classifier gè stands out in terms of productivity is common
knowledge among Sinologists. Confer also the correlation of
these numbers to our simple Internet search described above.
These percentages therefore provide a measure of comparison
that the frequencies of our classifiers of interest are correct.
On the basis of these frequency counts, we conclude that the
relatively significantly faster RT with the GRASPABLE.OBJECT
classifier cannot be attributed to biases caused by frequency
effects, since these would rather drive the RT data in the
opposite direction and yield shorter RT for congruent
trials in the BIG.OBJECT classifier condition than the
GRASPABLE.OBJECT classifier condition. In addition,
frequency could not explain the significantly longer RT for
the incongruent CL: GRASPABLE.OBJECT than for the
incongruent CL:BIG.OBJECT conditions.
RT in Grammaticality Judgment Tasks
Our results showed that incongruent trials had longer RTs than
congruent trials, in both conditions. How does this fit with
previous studies using this method? Grammaticality judgments
in general do not produce unanimous results with respect to
typical RTs of grammatical versus ungrammatical constructions.
Typically, RTs depend on the type of grammatical errormade in
the stimuli, e.g., errors of omission, agreement or transposition
(Blackwell et al., 1996). For agreement errors, typical RTs in
Blackwell et al.’s study range from 857 to 643 ms. In some
studies, RTs produced for the ungrammatical sentences are
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overall faster than for the grammatical sentences (Foursha et al.,
2006). This, however, depends on the kind of linguistic task given.
Post-sentence integration reflects a different type of process
than grammaticality judgment of a phrase. Hence, in another
study on Spanish by Leeser et al. (2011), which comes closest
to the type of grammaticality judgment in our experiment,
the gender stimuli used in combinations of noun-adjective
was slower for incongruent than for congruent noun-adjective
combinations. The task and procedure were similar to the ones
in our experimental paradigm. The agreement requirements
are akin to the grammatical constraints imposed on classifier-
noun combinations in that they are contiguous to the noun
and that there is some sort of semantic relationship between
modifier and noun (but probably less so for gender agreement).
In Spanish, most nouns that are suffixed -a are feminine, and
most nouns ending in -o are masculine. The adjective agrees with
the noun immediately preceding the adjective by suffixing the
same vowels as the noun; for example, cuento corto (masc.) ‘story
short’, ungrammatical ∗cuento corta, and in feminine nouns,
pluma roja (fem.) ‘pen red’, ungrammatical ∗pluma rojo. Twenty-
four grammatical/ungrammatical sentence pairs as in (1) were
presented where the target phrase was placed in object position.
(1)
a. El hombre limpia una ventana sucia par aver la calle.
Theman cleans aDet−Fem windowNoun−Fem dirtyAdj−Fem to see
the street.
b. ∗El hombre limpia una ventana sucio para ver la calle.
The man cleans aDet−Fem windowNoun−Fem dirtyAdj−Masc to
see the street.
The sentences were revealed in a word-by-word fashion, and
a prompt appeared on a separate screen after the sentence
with the question “Is the sentence grammatically correct?,”
and participants answered “yes” or “no”. The responses were
consistently slower for the incongruent trials. Thus, the RTs
achieved in our experiment reflect what can be expected on this
particular type of linguistic task.
Biological Impact on Linguistic Grounding?
In discussions on the interface between language and thought,
the question is often raised (e.g., Schmitt and Zhang, 1998;
Zhang and Schmitt, 1998; Saalbach and Imai, 2007; Gao and
Malt, 2009; Kuo and Sera, 2009; Huettig et al., 2010; Imai et al.,
2010) whether classifier categories have an effect on speakers’
conceptual system, concluding that language structure would
shape the way humans think. Our study has pointed out that the
reverse effect is a much more likely scenario: that the constraints
imposed by our attention systems founded in biology and
evolutionary history affect our general cognitive processes, which
again determine certain aspects of linguistic structure in favor
of grounding abstract grammatical categories directly in relation
to the modalities that were active in the acquisition process.
From cognitive psychology it is known that as children’s brains’
motoric systems develop, new action systems emerge in parallel.
In this process, they generate new abilities such as attending
to objects and exploring them, learning to control events and
their potential outcomes. This is in accordance with the facts
outlined in the present study that some features of language may
be shaped by constraints outside of language structure itself, even
in the case of implicitly acquired grammatical categories. We
see this reflected in language learning: although children master
nominal classifier expressions rather early, the acquisition of the
semantic system underlying the partitions is much slower, and
may not fully resemble the adult system even at the age of nine
(Aikhenvald, 2000). Interestingly, which classifiers are acquired
at what ages seems not to be entirely random. In Chinese, only
the three dimensional small (i.e., graspable) object classifiers
are mastered up to the age of four in addition to the human
classifiers (Erbaugh, 1986). We know that at 2 years of age,
only gross motor skills are fully developed in children; they can
for example jump and walk. A similar study on first language
acquisition of Japanese nominal classifiers parallels the idea that
categories for small objects are acquired early, but adds the
dimension of fine motor skills. Yamamoto and Keil (2000) reports
that while the power-grasp classifier -ko for small, graspable
objects is the first shape-specific classifier to be learnt around
the age of two, the pinch-grip classifier used of tiny objects like
grains of rice, -tsubu, is acquired much later, around the age
of five (cf. Matsumoto, 1985a,b, 1987, citing Okubo, 1967 and
Murata, 1983). Gross motor skills develop prior to fine motor
skills, and not until the age of three can a child use scissors
for cutting or run on her toes. This development of linguistic
categories therefore parallels motoric development in children.
In her study on parallels between the acquisition and historical
development of Chinese nominal classifiers, Erbaugh also argues
that sensorimotor reinforcement is vital to early classifier use.
Language learning suggests that building object knowledge
and the corresponding concepts and categories begins with
physical interactions with concrete objects in the external world.
Chinese children’s acquisition of classifiers is designated by
distinct stages that reflect going from specific item to concrete
objects to generalizations over types. In study Erbaugh’s (1986),
the use of specialized semantic classifiers on the whole was
rare and developed slowly in children in the age span 1.10
(1 year and 10 months) to 3.10. At this stage (stage 1) they
associated specialized classifiers lexically to a specific referent.
(This pattern is also attested in the historical development of
the classifier system from ancient to modern Chinese). When
classifier use started developing (stage 2), children generalized
from a prototype while they also overgeneralized and used the
classifier in incorrect but plausible ways, e.g., the extension of
bǎ ( ) ‘graspable objects’ incorrectly to fish [where the correct
classifier is wěi ( )]. For our purposes it is interesting to note
that one of the two most frequently generalized classifiers in
child language data refer to small size, i.e., graspable objects.
Furthermore, in this stage, which occurred after age 2.6, the
children ‘used classifiers exclusively for concrete objects which
they had handled.’ The two children aged 2.10 and 2.6 only
used classifiers that referred to movable, concrete objects, and
the same was the case in 63 out of 68 classifiers used by
the older child at 3.10. Erbaugh points out that this is in
accordance with psychological principles of early learning, the
Piagetian action schema. In support of our assumption that
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grammatical categories can be biologically grounded, Erbaugh
(1986) reasons that classifiers evidently reveal already-emerging
conceptual categories rather than pre-shaping them.
In what way could these concepts be ‘already-emerging’ prior
to language acquisition? And how does the brain derive unitary
representations of external space across different modalities? The
existence of multisensory neurons and receptive fields (RFs)
constitute a neuroscientific explanation to near space attention
as well as to object size. Given the presumably more complex
process of integrating two modalities, vision and touch, why
should graspability induce shorter RTs? The answer might be the
existence of specialized bimodal visuotactile neurons in certain
brain areas, so-called multisensory neurons.
Knowledge of graspable vs. large size objects depends
on multimodal integration in the brain. A large body of
neuropsychological data supports a subdivision of space whose
definition depends solely on the potential graspability of objects.
This subdivision separates space into two domains: the near or
peripersonal space, and the far or extrapersonal space (Brozzoli
et al., 2012; Nemmi et al., 2013) – corresponding to within
and beyond arm’s reach, quite literally defined. This space is
malleable and will temporarily shrink if access to peripersonal
space is reduced, e.g., by placing a panel between a participant
and the graspable object (single cell recordings of monkey:
Caggiano et al., 2009), or increase, when participants are provided
with a tool; neurons in post-central gyrus and intraparietal
sulcus began to display visual responses after monkeys were
trained to use a rake to reach food pellets (Iriki et al., 1996).
Processing of near and far space is believed to rely on two
different cortical visual processing streams (Ungerleider and
Mishkin, 1982; Goodale and Milner, 1992). The different types
of visual processing have implications for attention. Normal
as well as pathological asymmetries of visuospatial attention
may differ depending on the distance of stimulus presentation
(Shelton et al., 1990; Halligan and Marshall, 1991; McCourt
and Garlinghouse, 2000; Varnava et al., 2002; Committeri et al.,
2007). Heber (2010) concludes that differences in attentional
asymmetries with respect to depth suggest dissociable neural
mechanisms for visual attentional processing in near and far
space. Intersecting the near-far space division one finds two
separate but overlapping spatial attention systems which underlie
human behavior, suggested to reflect a phylogenetically old
mechanism developed for information processing to handle
further potential action (Chica et al., 2013). One is oriented
endogenously to stimuli that are relevant for the task at hand and
is directed at will or expectancy of where stimuli appear; the other
is oriented exogenously and serves to avoid danger of unexpected
happenings. Typical triggers of exogenous attention would be
saliency markers like luminance changes, onsets, or moving
stimuli. The definition of peripersonal space actually originates
from studies using single-cell recordings in the macaque brain
(Brozzoli et al., 2012). These recordings demonstrated the
existence of multisensory neurons in several areas in the cat
and monkey brain: the putamen, superior colliculus, ventral and
dorsal premotor cortex (BA6), and parietal areas 7b and the
ventral intraparietal sulcus (Rizzolatti et al., 1987; Fogassi et al.,
1999; Graziano, 2001). Cells in these areas that are responsive
to active stimuli on the animal’s arm and hand have RFs for the
region of space close to the animal’s arm. The visual RFs of these
neurons follow the hand around when the experimenter places
the arm in different postures (Graziano and Botvinick, 2002).
In other words, these bimodal neuron populations encode space
not according to retinotopic or head positions, but on the basis
of a hand-centered coordinate system (Rizzolatti et al., 1997).
If the hand is moved, the neurons will instead respond to the
hand’s new position (Reed et al., 2006). RFs are independent of
gaze direction (Gentilucci et al., 1983; Fogassi et al., 1992), and
visually evoked responses of these neurons are instead modulated
by the distance between the visual object and the tactile RF
(Brozzoli et al., 2012). The effect of this modulation is that visual
information can be coded that is dependent on the body part
containing the tactile RF; for example, large RFs in premotor
cortex of the monkey brain containing tactile neurons discharge
in response to visual stimuli.
Notably, special RF areas are particularly responsive to object
size; in other words, object affordances are encoded directly in
the individual’s brain. Visuotactile neurons in rostral subregion
F5 of area 6, although less numerous than in the F4 RF neurons,
are driven by stimuli size more than by closeness to body
(Rizzolatti and Gentilucci, 1988; Rizzolatti et al., 1988). The
motor properties of premotor and parietal areas, as well as the
interconnectivity of the premotor cortex to the primary motor
cortex and to the spinal cord, suggest that the role of these
structures are not just visual-perceptual, but rather part of a
perception-action interface, where they subserve the body parts’
approaching movements toward an object (Gardner et al., 2007;
Brozzoli et al., 2012), and are part of the dorsal stream for
grasping. Similar multisensory representations of peripersonal
space in humans are supported by numerous behavioral (e.g.,
Spence et al., 2004; Lloyd et al., 2006; Makin et al., 2007), and
neuroimaging studies (Lloyd et al., 2003), indicating that the
same network of neural structures is involved in the multisensory
representation in primates – the VIP-F4 circuit (Rizzolatti et al.,
2002).
These multisensory spatial representations can be impaired
in humans as well as in monkeys following selective brain
damage (Spence et al., 2008). Importantly, damage to the relevant
visuotactile and parietal regions can cause attention deficits in
the form of hemineglect in monkeys, restricted to peripersonal
space (Rizzolatti et al., 1983). Crucially, if peripersonal space
is represented in a similar fashion in several species, there is
reason to believe that the special status of the area immediately
surrounding the body is an evolutionary trait, and not just a result
of each individual’s learning process. In other words, concepts
implying this space are grounded by biology. This points to the
idea that much of the neural hardware involved in language is not
specific to it (Christiansen, 2013).
However, one faculty might not preclude the other. Just as
humans are thought to be neurally equipped at birth to develop
language skills, they may have an innate biological predisposition
for linking vision and action. The fact that fast instinctive
physical reactions (e.g., shielding with hand, blinking with eye)
is linked to the (anticipatory) avoidance of rapidly approaching
objects into the visual field in near space (Fogassi et al.,
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1996; Cooke and Graziano, 2004; Graziano and Cooke, 2006)
provides additional support for an evolutionarily determined co-
development of vision and motor action. It is important here to
stress that voluntary object-oriented actions, such as would be the
neurocognitive basis for the graspable object classifier, also can be
anticipatory (Rizzolatti et al., 1981a,b, 1997; Gardner et al., 2007).
In total, these studies indicate that not only are the
mechanisms underlying perception, attention, and memory
dependent on the relationship between perceivers and their
environment, they also demonstrate that this interdependence
relates to the individual’s planned motor action within action
space. If these psychological and biological facts are continually
shown to impact on the mental representations of grammars,
the connection between these higher-order, abstract grammatical
markers to biology and general cognition can successfully be
explained in terms of linguistic grounding.
Grounding Abstract Sensorimotor Referencing
Categories; Implications for Theory
A discussion still goes on about the adequacy of embodied
cognition to account for abstract concepts. Failure to address this
question implies failure to vouch for embodied cognition as a
general theory for language, since abstract concepts will then
only be satisfactorily accounted for in amodal systems. Various
neuroscientific models of conceptual representation have been
proposed in varying degrees of embodiment, the representatives
of which have tended to guard their perspective vigilantly against
the opposing standpoints (for a review, see Meteyard et al.,
2012). The new trend in the embodiment debate, however,
is to propose that models should show how and to what
extent embodied concrete and abstract concepts are combined
in language use and grammar, thus positing a theoretical and
pragmatic opposition between ‘abstract’ and ‘grounded’ within the
same linguistic model (see, for instance Vigliocco et al., 2009;
Arbib et al., 2014; Zwaan, 2014). Underlying these attempts
is the assumption that abstract and embodied concepts are
somehow mutually exclusive. For example, Zwaan (2014) poses
an opposition between ‘abstract’ and ‘grounded’ in saying that
‘Accepting that we need both abstract and grounded symbols
leads to a new set of questions. When do we need which and
how do they interact?’ The same contrast is inherently assumed
in Moseley and Pulvermüller (2014) when they discuss whether
the brain distinguishes primarily between grammatical categories
(nouns and verbs) or is topographically organized according to
sensorimotor semantic classes in amodal vs. embodied theories.
Our investigation, by contrast, demonstrates that there
need be no notional nor empirical contradiction between
‘sensorimotor’ and ‘abstract’, since abstraction is a process of
the mind that has less to do with physical tangibility than
with the typical summary representation that any concept
is based on, irrespective of experiential basis or placement
along the vertical axis in taxonomic-linguistic and grammatical
hierarchies. This is evident by the stimuli used in our experiment;
nominal classifiers that generalize over sensorimotor interaction
abstractly representing sensorimotor affordances in grammatical
classes. Pulvermüller (2013) discusses four separate mechanisms
of establishing ‘symbolic meaning’, two of which refer to
the ‘abstraction mechanisms for generalizing over a range of
instances of semantic meaning’ and ‘referential semantics’, ‘which
establishes links between symbols and their objects and actions
they are used to speak about.’ In our investigation, however, we
have shown that there is no contradiction between ‘referential
semantics’ and ‘abstract semantics’, since classifiers are deictic,
abstract grammatical elements.
The difference between abstract and concrete is better
explained in terms of specificity. The concrete-abstract scale
is typically inversely related to the number of members
in each category, i.e., the less properties are necessary to
describe the category, the more abstract it is and the more
members fit into the category. We relate here to the original
sense of the word ‘abstract’ as it was derived from Latin
abstractus, perfect passive participle of abstrahô, formed from
abs- (“away”) + trahô (“draw”), pointing to the mind’s
ability to extract from single referents and generalize over
several experiential instances in the process of forming ever
more general concepts. That is, a concept is not formed
by recalling one concrete instance but by comprising all
previous encounters in a common mental representation, be
that encounters with similar objects and situations in the
real world in the formation of, e.g., noun concepts, or
generalizations over a class of lexical units such as the nouns
themselves. Since nominal classifiers generalize over nouns,
they are in fact synchronically abstractions over abstractions.
This process requires a mind’s ability to organize within
a hierarchical structure, and when a word changes into a
grammatical marker abstraction happens along this vertical
axis. One of the successful traits of human language as an
efficient communication device is the development of mental
grammars. The ability to abstract is a precondition for developing
grammars. Grammatical morphemes come about as a result
of grammaticalization processes, in which abstraction equals
lessening the semantic content while increasing their general
value of application. The specific mechanism is the above
outlined capability that the brain has to recognize similarities
across different concrete experiences and extract a mental
representation generalization, which are applicable to and
comprises all former encounters.
While advocating a basic division between ‘abstract’ and
‘concrete-grounded’, Zwaan (2014) also allows for embodied
representation of low specificity concepts: ‘There were 50 red
roses in the vase,’ which specifies the exact number of roses, and
‘Several people entered the house,’ which underspecifies number,
gender and age of the people entering. While both sentences
may be mentally represented and grounded in sensory and
motor experiences, detailed representation is not a prerequisite
for a concept to be grounded. Our experiment confirms this
supposition. In the present investigation we have shown that
‘abstract’ need not be mutually exclusive of ‘grounded’.
Conceptualisation is the founding mechanism and key success
factor of language, the types of which differ only in complexity
and type of experiential bases. In principle, there is no type of
experiential basis that language could not turn into an abstract
concept, and sensorimotor experiences are no exception. The
fact that referencing intangible experiences and generalizing
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over multiple encounters are fundamentally different processes
is evident by the fact that languages also conceptually represent
generalizations over intangible referents, for example emotions;
Vietnamese has two nominal classifiers for emotions: niếm
‘sentiment’ defines a short-term sentiment that arises in a
certain situation (grief, rage, joy) and nỗi ‘feeling’, which defines
a sentiment that lasts for a while (the sadness of a refugee,
affliction, despair; Trấn, online). The folk etymology extension
of ‘abstract’ to comprehend intangible referents might have
arisen out of the realization that generalizing over multiple
encounters of items in effect amounts to each of the items being
intangible.
The confusion may also be due to the fact that languages may
employ several mechanisms simultaneously. In metaphorical
extensions, concrete sensorimotor experiences often serve as
a basis for highlighting features of mental, emotional, social
interaction or grammatical phenomena. Such conceptualisations
use feature extraction in exactly the same way as in feature
extraction of encounters with concrete objects and situations
that form nouns and verbs, but in addition represent intangible
experiential domains. For example, in Hausa grammar (West
Africa), the samemorpheme -r is used tomark physical causation
and mental coercion. For example, adding the -r suffix to the verb
zaunàa ‘to sit (intransitive)’ creates zaunar ‘to seat (somebody)’;
likewise, in mental transfers like kooyar ‘to teach’ are derived
from a base form kòoyaa ‘to learn’ (Lobben, 2010). In other
words, turning physical situations into the mental transfers of
social situations is one of the basic building blocks of language.
In such grammaticalization processes, a word may be selected
for either one or several of paths of transfer and differential
features of the basic word may be highlighted, all of which
are based in a basic, often sensorimotor experience. As we
saw for Chinese, the previously existing, physical interaction
verb *ba ‘to grasp’ developed into denoting the abstract
knowledge of affordances of graspable objects (the classifier), a
purposive marker signifying intent, or the metaphorical-abstract
understanding of acting on an object (the transitivity marker).
Whether or not the two latter instances of ba, grammatical
procedures that do not necessarily imply interaction with objects
in the acquisition process, are also grounded, remains an open
question.
Grammaticality Judgments Reflect Immediate
and Unattended Conceptual Processing
Critics of embodied theories have suggested that modal
activations are due to mental imagery, i.e., to post-comprehension
processes. The physiological effects in modal areas could
thus be caused by a ‘post-understanding inference’ (Mahon
and Caramazza, 2008; Papeo and Caramazza, 2013, 2014).
Pulvermüller (2012) and Shtyrov et al. (2014) point out that
immediacy, functional relevance and automaticity each suggests
that modal activations are intrinsic rather than epiphenomenal to
conceptual processing. Viewed against research on peripersonal
hand space, differential RTs rather suggest immediacy, functional
relevance and automaticity of visuomotor effects on attention
in hand space for abstract grammatical categories. They are
immediate because they appear to be directly grounded in
biological processes (cf. discussion above); they are functionally
relevant because the visuomotor classifier evidently activates
sensorimotor readiness for action more than the visual
modality classifier; and they are automatic because grammatical
concepts are not attended to consciously. Our results are
therefore a valid contribution to the discussion on the
necessity of embodiment in conceptual representations in the
brain.
Future Directions
While studies on grounding by sensorimotor interaction of
lexical-level linguistic concepts are abundant and keep being
published (Barsalou, 2008; Moseley et al., 2011; Innocenti et al.,
2014; Moseley and Pulvermüller, 2014), studies using abstract
grammatical stimuli are only starting to appear (e.g., Tettamanti
et al., 2008; Bergen and Wheeler, 2010; Capelle et al., 2010).
We would encourage more research on grammatical morphemes
and the semantics of syntactic structures (Goldberg, 2006).
We would also encourage proper linguistic analyses to be
carried out on stimuli. A practice in the field still prevails
that conflates as ‘abstract’ the two fundamentally different
phenomena: intangible referent and generalizing over variation.
Many of the studies within the embodied cognition framework
relating to abstract concepts deal with internal state concepts
such as emotions (e.g., Moseley et al., 2011). In such studies,
abstract equals internal state, and although we shall not a
priori exclude the possibility that internal state experiences
and generalizations can be associated at word level semantics
(e.g., complex situational with emotional connotations as in
‘peace’, or internal-external experience based concepts such as
‘beauty’), it is important to notionally separate these in research
procedures.
Conclusion
Our interest in the present investigation was in finding out
whether what is known about attention and neurophysiological
bias for graspable objects in hand space had any effect on the
processing of abstract, grammatical categories.
It is known that while endogenous attention is a top–
down process developed for immediate action, exogenous
attention is a reactive process driven by bottom–up perceptive
stimuli for which the individual is not already prepared. Each
attention system modulates the individual’s performance,
accommodating intentional goals and environmental
circumstances. This is in line with the typical characteristics
of an individual’s peripersonal space, a region of space
that affords considerations of how to prepare appropriate
course of actions in near space corresponding to top–
down mental processes. It also explains why actions in
near space are characterized by a special immediacy. Faster
RTs to the nominal classifier for graspable objects in
Chinese are likely a reflection of this immediacy: action is
driven by endogenous attention and intention as a result
of previous experience with handheld objects. The same
real-world experience showed a slow disengagement effect
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for the graspable object classifier, reflecting a person’s uninclined
disposition to alter an attention focus that is invested in
near space. The nominal classifier referring to knowledge
about big sized objects, by contrast, although salient by
virtue of their largeness, did not spur similar effects. When
considering the reported results against the backdrop of existing
literature on hand-related physiological and cognitive processes
we hold it to be likely that the graspable nominal classifier
is differentially grounded from the big nominal classifier in
Chinese.
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